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ABSTRACT 
ERIK CHILD: Watiting for Supermensch? On the Use and Abuse of Bildung in 
Education 
(Under the direction of Dr. Lynda Stone) 
 
 This thesis will investigate the formulation of Bildung in Nietzsche‟s lectures, On 
the Future of our Educational Institutions. Four strands in this formulation are as follows: 
1) The natural world as educative influence. 2) Bildung as an aesthetic discipline. 3) How 
wonder is the end goal of a classical education. 4) Nietzsche‟s argument that Bildung and 
democracy are incompatible. A critique of Nietzsche‟s ideas follows. In tension with 
Nietzsche‟s account of Bildung is education scholar Klause Prange‟s argument that 
Bildung is compatible with and necessary to democracy. Two contrasting understandings 
of Bildung emerge. The first is Nietzsche‟s notion of the term as preparatory for an 
eventual genius. The second is Prange‟s account of Bildung as a preparation for more 
humane institutions. The latter alternative to Nietzsche is considered as a potential model 
for a more hospitable culture to learning in U.S. educational settings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 American schools suffer from a culture that is arguably inhospitable to intellectual 
pursuits. The teaching profession in particular is inhibited by a perception of inferiority 
next to the worlds of business, government, media, law, medicine, or other research 
sciences. There is at least a popular perception of teachers as having chosen their 
profession for lack of having other avenues of success. As intellectual endeavors go, 
teaching, sadly enough, does not compare favorably to those mentioned above. The study 
of education has been criticized as having neither intellectual depth and cultural resources 
(subjects at least traditionally associated with the humanities), nor specialized knowledge 
and sound, applicable research (often associated with both pure and applied sciences).  
 How education can actually be pursued as a division within the core humanities—a 
question of history, literature, political science, and philosophy—became a matter of 
personal concern. That education was one of the highest priorities of some of the most 
seminal minds in the history of ideas was clear: Dewey, Arendt, Matthew Arnold, 
Newman, Emerson, Schiller, Kant, Rousseau, Vico, Locke, Montaigne, and back to 
Aristotle and Plato—all have strenuously directed their thought to the question of human 
upbringing, and what quality of learning would best serve. Both the anti-intellectualism I 
experienced in the public schools, together with the problems plaguing the study of  
education (especially what struck me at the time as a disarming distance from the history  
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of ideas) furthered my interest in the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche‟s critques of 
education. I soon learned of his own work addressing universities and schools alike, 
albeit in early 1870‟s Germany: On the Future of Our Educational Institutions (1872). 
The title of these lectures at least seemed to promise a healthy anachronism, a possible 
voice for reengaging the roots of education in our time.  
 Having spent a fair share of time familiarizing myself with both the lectures and 
this general period in Nietzsche‟s philosophy, however, led me to conclude that this was 
ultimately a narrow route for education, less a clearing through the intellectual wasteland 
as a detour into a strange wilderness in the form of Nietzsche‟s abstruse re-
conceptualization of Greek tragedy and pre-Socratic philosophy. Nietzsche‟s reactionary 
tone, confined to his own view of the Greeks, his discounting of scientific research (as if 
“wonder,” a quality he admires, could only arise from philosophical and aesthetic 
endeavors and not from empirical studies as well), his unilateral emphases on the 
preparation for the genius, and his relentless critique of democracy as impeding his 
realization, gave serious pause to my previous hope in philosophy as something 
practicable in the public sphere, a sphere to which public schools manifestly belong.  
 This does not mean that I do not concede that educational matters, whether research 
in curricula, policy, school planning, pedagogy, learning and motivation (or the practice 
of teaching and learning), are not still in great need of wisdom. If history-of-ideas are not 
the right approach to educational concerns, then neither is the lack of intellectualism seen 
in the preparation of teachers and the general ethos of public schools. On the contrary, 
my principle problem with Nietzsche is that he too is not intellectually curious enough, 
unwilling to go beyond the boundaries of pseudo-mythical narratives of culture,  
uninterested in the astonishing diversity of attributes and interests in young learners and 
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the challenges of how to best nurture them in a world of dramatic disparities between 
professional specialization of knowledge on the one hand, and near ignorance or 
unaffecting and ineffective general information on the other. Nietzsche, in short, does not 
give guidance to actual educational institutions and educators, but only to his dreams of a 
literary Overman, a mythologized Greek antiquity, and a romanticized Germany.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW AND THESIS 
 
 This essay will consider how Bildung is used for Nietzsche‟s early philosophy, to 
which it will be contrasted with alternate, and arguably more humane, wholistic accounts. 
The first section will deal with arguments for taking up a serious interest in Bildung in the 
first place. I will then discuss what Klaus Prange‟s article posits concerning what Bildung 
is, including its power to mitigate dehumanizing tendencies in both the school and work 
environments. 
 Following Prange‟s account, I will introduce the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. 
After a brief sketch of his life, I will provide a synopsis of key points in the lectures 
themselves, calling attention to four arguments that emerge over the course of these 
lectures: 1) Bildung seeks to shape a poetic reader of nature; in order to realize this end, 
the student must necessarily be formed by a Greek understanding of nature itself. 2) 
Bildung can never be reduced to a science, because it is an inherently aesthetic discipline. 
3) Both the result and the process of forming human beings of genius, is “wonder,” and 
therefore Nietzsche‟s conception of the future of Bildung is essentially a preparation for 
the future creative philosopher he aspires to be. 4) Finally, Nietzschean Bildung sees 
democracy as a serious impediment to the development of talent. Taken together, 
Nitzschean education means the perception and formation of a self that succeeds in 
contributing a work of dramatic art to posterity, rather then viewing art as a means to 
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shape the human psyche. Following the exploration of these themes, I will take up certain 
disagreements, difficulties, and inadequacies related to Nietzsche‟s text.     
 I will then consider a view of Bildung that not only embraces compatibility with 
democratic institutions but that moreover seeks for their improvement. This entails an 
articulation of four criteria within Bildung that results in a setting or community 
amenable to learning and teaching. These are explored in sections 5—8 as follows: 5) 
Seeing the intrinsic worth and potential in all educational participants. 6) Valuing  
curricula reflecting human significance and aesthetics. 7) Conceptualizing students, 
teachers, and all others concerned with education, as life-long learners. 8) Participating in 
and communicating effectively with institutions beyond the school, in the infrastructures 
of sectors both public and private. All such criteria regard Bildung as a way of bringing 
about the general improvement, development, and dedication to learning in more 
communities, and as a preparation for the wise mediation of political responsibilities 
between authority and the general citizenry. This entails finding a clearer conception of 
what kind of human beings and institutions a democratic view of Bildung would produce, 
in contrast to Nietzsche‟s aristocratic type.   
 Therefore, this essay explores two ways of thinking about the idea of what it means 
to “build” educators and educated—Nietzsche‟s Bildung for the sake of a higher form of 
Man, or Bildung for the sake of an environment more formative of human beings. Of the 
two, I argue that the latter is preferable as a prescription for the present-day malaise, 
dehumanization and dissatisfaction in too much of U.S. education policy.  
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2  
RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY OF BILDUNG 
 
 Just what Bildung is can be taken for granted insofar as it is the kind of term on 
which a number of opinions and justifications can rest unexamined. Yet when probed, 
such a word is seen to be multi-faceted, complex, indeterminate, and highly allusive of 
aims of a historical and philosophical nature. It is all-too malleable to define outright. 
Nevertheless, a question of the “culture in the schools today,” or “the present educational 
culture or climate” may serve as a point of departure. In order to move closer to what 
culture is in education, or what it can be at its best, and on what grounds this is so, 
exploring Nietzsche’s conception will reveal the sometimes esoteric and strange 
appropriations in its name. Consideration of what “an education” even means, and to 
what ends, if any, it is directed, is actually an inquiry into the nature of human culture. To 
do this, a different educational tradition is needed to help articulate culture as a form of 
education.   
 In addressing the question of culture in education through the idea of Bildung, 
several dimensions are possible: love of learning for its own sake, human development, 
and the larger culture within which the individual develops in concert with others. 
Bildung has an advantage over the English word “culture,” whose connotation does not 
so readily include specifically educational concerns. On the one hand, “development” 
does not suffice because it carries mainly psychological associations—a scientific, as 
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opposed to aesthetic, notion of maturity. Aesthetic development, on the other hand, is 
very much in the province of Bildung. Within the context of Bildung, education is a 
distinctly aesthetic process. Bildung can therefore engage all of these permutations—
culture, development, learning, aesthetics—an aggregate word, speaking through a 
discourse that is holistic, aesthetic, and conscious of human form and formation 
throughout life.  
 Bildung therefore serves as a gathering to the many disparities and incongruities 
within the education world, and can possibly serve as a bridge over the abyss between the 
theory of what education could or should conceivably be (especially as seen in the 
traditional philosophies of education) and what it often is in the dreary realities faced by 
students and teachers in U.S. public schools. This is because Bildung is both content that 
has no utilitarian function (a work of art, a prelude, a poem), and metamorphoses 
(training, personal change, psychological struggle, transformation, and eventual greater 
realization of interests). It can be used both as noun (as in when one says “he has good 
form”) and verb (“her skills in analysis form rapidly”). These dichotemies continue—at 
once external, overcoming time (what the Greeks refer to as Kairos) and yet also highly 
contextualized and dependent on it (associated with the more familiar Greek word for 
time, Kronos). It seeks integration between the architecture and physical-natural 
environment within which a school is set and the organization within a young mind of the 
curricula that exercises, nurtures, absorbs, and eventually augments the expression of 
who each person is.  
 Possibilities for Bildung should therefore be seriously considered out of a desire to 
find a more perfect archetype for educational environments, aims, practices, quality 
curricula, student motivations, and teaching roles. This impetus also calls for at least an 
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initial inquiry into the nature of Bildung itself. Doing so will reveal contrasting notions of 
exactly who the recipients of Bildung should be, what Bildung seeks to develop, and why.  
Such contrasts of intellectual perspectives will offer a way to explore an aspect of the  
radical dynamism inherent to this word, and to consider what important similarities these 
visions offer for what it means to think of education as a conscious attempt to 
intellectually and experientially “make,” or “remake” a person. It is, in sum, asking how 
best to approach the famous analogy for education provided by philosopher Friedrich 
Schiller (1982) in his On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters:  
With the pedagogic or the political artist things are very different indeed. 
For him Man is at once the material on which he works and the goal 
towards which he strives. In this case the end turns back upon itself and 
becomes identical with the medium; and it is only inasmuch as the whole 
serves the parts that the parts are in any way bound to submit to the whole 
(p. 20-21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
KLAUS PRANGE AND THE PARAGDIGM OF BILDUNG 
 
 Writing for the European Educational Research Journal, Klause Prange draws 
attention to the rich panoply of meanings that are associated with Bildung. Included 
(besides education and culture) is “formation,” “growth,” “shape,” “refinement” and 
intellectual discipline  (Prange, 2004, p. 502).  He views such diversity as the foundation 
for its strength and endurance as a concept. The very ambiguity and wide-ranging 
meanings make it adaptable to the highly complex interaction of topics within the study 
of education and the age-old topic of how learning actually takes place. Early on, Prange 
identifies Bildung as learning characterized by self-determination, and apart from the 
“indoctrination” of state educational agendas. In spite of this, Prange concedes that 
Bildung often is associated with an “aristocratic and elitist heritage” (p. 502). He 
nevertheless also asserts that a case can be made for it in the context of  21
st
 century 
norms. 
 These norms, for Prange, neglect the “aesthetic and spiritual” sides of lives in favor 
of hallow methodologies (Prange, 2004, p. 503). He explores how such methods are 
based on instrumentalist, utilitarian accounts of life, accounts well suited to the codes and 
conventions that often rule in professional settings. Though such “rules of the game” may 
at times be necessary, Prange argues that the work of education should attend to the 
“individuality and moral accountability” (p. 505-506) of the person entrusted with 
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responsibilities in the modern world. He likens this to steering a ship: “one hand for the 
boat, the other hand for the man” (p. 506). 
 Prange connects Bildung to 19
th
 century Germany and to what it shares with the 
Paideia of Greek antiquity. By asking how the term Bildung can regain its relevance, one 
can profit from an examination of how Bildung was articulated two centuries ago. The 
arch-term for development underwent a crucial development of its own from the time of  
Schiller (1759—1805), to the that of Nietzsche (1844—1900), from an optimistic view of 
human maturity, compatible with democracy, to a severe, aristocratic, Hellenic focus on 
the formation of a higher type of man, or genius.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4  
NIETZSCHE AND BILDUNG 
 
Introducing Nietzsche 
 Friederich Nietzsche arguably cast the longest shadow over 20th-century 
intellectual thought. He was born in 1844 to a Protestant minister. As a youth, he showed 
an intense fascination with the metaphoric power of language that remained with him 
throughout his life, informing the aphoristic literary qualities of his philosophical prose. 
He began his formal study of classical philology at the University of Leipzig in 1865. 
Around this time, he became familiar with Schopenhauer‟s major oeuvre, The World as 
Will and Representation. A few years later he came into contact with the dominant 
personality and influence of later 19th century music, the composer Richard Wagner and 
his wife Cosima. Before turning twenty-five, Nietzsche was appointed in 1869 to an 
associate professorship in classical philology at the University in Basel. There, Nietzsche 
commenced his friendship with the historian of antiquity, Jacob Burckhardt. Aside from 
Burckhardt and a few other friends, Nietzsche disliked his university post, and resigned 
in the year 1879.  
 Nietzsche then began a nomadic life, publishing during this time his mature works, 
including The Gay Science (1882), Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883--1885), and Beyond 
Good and Evil (1886). In January of 1889, he suffered a mental breakdown, and spent the 
last ten years of his life in psychiatric institutions or under the supervision of family and  
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friends, including his mother. This breakdown was in some sense an intensification of his 
alternating extreme moods, from depression to exuberant megalomania. Nietzsche died 
on August 25, 1900. 
 It is significant for present purposes that Nietzsche was hypercritical of the 
democratic and contemporary reforms taking place in educational thought. Together with 
mass politics, modern educational tendencies remained a persistent enemy throughout his 
published work. Consider, for example, this passage on education in one of Nietzsche‟s 
last works, Twilight of the Idols: 
In present-day Germany no one is any longer free to give his children a 
noble education: our “higher schools” are all set up for the most 
ambiguous mediocrity, with their teachers, curricula, and teaching aims. 
And everywhere an indecent haste prevails, as if something would be lost 
if the young man of twenty-three were not yet “finished,” or if he did not 
yet know the answer to the “main question”: which calling? A higher kind 
of human being, if I may say so, does not like “callings,” precisely 
because he knows himself to be called...at thirty one is, in the sense of 
high culture, a beginner, a child. Our overcrowded secondary schools, our 
overworked, stupefied secondary-school teachers, are a scandal. (p. 510-
511).  
 
  Much of the scholarly literature approaches Nietzsche‟s views on education as a 
recurring motif in most of his books, drawing on both passages explicitly related to 
education, or highlighting his general role as a philosopher-educator, even if these 
writings do not directly bear on the German university and gymnasium. Different from 
other treatments, this thesis does not utilize education as a vehicle to understand some 
larger aspect of Nietzsche‟s work. Instead, it is focused on the formulation of Bildung 
found in five lectures delivered early in his career, between January and late March, 
1872, entitled Uber die Zukunft Unserer Bildungsanstalten, or On the Future of our 
Educational Institutions, recently published in English by St. Augustine‟s Press, 2004. 
These lectures serve as the basis for the consideration of Bildung.  
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Overview of the Lectures 
 Nietzsche‟s lectures, delivered at the University in Basel, present something of a 
puzzle to readers seeking a coherent understanding of his views on education. Their form 
fluctuates from conversation between an older teacher and  students, to the hortatory tone 
of an impassioned speech aimed at rousing a distinguished audience towards a new, 
quasi-mythic narrative of education rooted in classical antiquity. This audience included 
the Wagners as well as Burchardt, whose overview of an interdependent and flourishing 
culture in Civilization of Renaissance Italy remains a standard of its kind (Nietzsche, 
2004, p. 1). Nietzsche himself was rather dissatisfied with On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions, canceling the contract for what was intended to be his next book 
after Birth of Tragedy, also of 1872 (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 2).  He also used portions of this 
work in the Untimely Meditations of 1874, a collection of four extended essays 
(Nietzsche, 2004 p. 4). Indeed, there is the sense that many of the recurring ideas in these 
lectures had yet to assume a more developed and decided form. Significantly, Nietzsche 
had intended for six lectures, but the last was never written (p. 3).  
 Now a turn to the extent lectures: Lecture I introduces readers to students seeking 
an oasis from their university life. They arrive in the slopes of the Rhineland, where they 
will commemorate past conversations involving their future aspirations. Some time after 
their arrival, they discover that they are not alone. An older man, initially is rather 
understandably disturbed by these students, who begin to practice pistol shooting into the 
late afternoon air (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 26). Referred to only as the Old Philosopher, he 
has chosen the same location for a reflection with his former pupil on, of all matters, the 
state of educational institutions in Germany. When the two parties realize they have 
mutual interests about education, they become better disposed toward each other (p. 31), 
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and begin sharing their respective reflections. The first lecture winds down with the Old 
Philosopher‟s tirade against the popular press as constituting a tyranny of public opinion, 
making philosophy itself more rare (p. 40).  
 Lecture II critiques journalistic style that then leads to a prolonged discussion on 
the state of academic writing (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 44-57). The students and the teacher 
both agree that the handling of language by educational authorities is barberic and that 
students should study models of classical rhetoric to appreciate the artistry involved, as 
well as tremble at their own attempts to write.   
 Lecture III provides further cogent critiques of the state of “classical education” and 
the scholarly methods employed in Nietzsche‟s time. The suggestion is that modern 
philology has an effect on antiquity similar to that of invading barbarians in 5th century 
Rome.  Just as they left broken colosseums and ruined palaces for posterity, so also the 
recent scholarship, with its scrutinizing skepticism of authorship, serves only to break 
texts attributed to Homer or Aeschylus into incompatible shards (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 71).  
 Lecture IV outlines the special importance of nature in the development of the 
genius (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 83-84). This education according to nature establishes a 
connection to the literature of Germany, as well as to the metaphysical nature of the pre-
Socratic philosophers. Within the dialogue, the teacher contrasts the nobility of this 
education against one rooted in economic necessity. In this lecture, the philosopher 
makes the case for why the genius would have need of an educational institution in the 
first place, when many artists and thinkers seem to favor independence from the public 
sphere (p. 90). The philosopher counters that it is precisely a sign that a culture has failed 
when it is able to the greatest minds are alienated from the public (p. 92-93).  
 Lecture V explores the condition of the modern student who is deprived of actual 
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development by having at best only a superficial understanding of the Greeks. Remove 
their literature, together with genuine philosophy, and there is no ladder upon which to  
ascend to a meaningful education (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 110). The result is a student who is 
misled into believing he has been educated, only to discover too late that he lacks the 
confidence necessary to lead a truly independent life. Instead he is always blindly led and 
at the mercy of public opinion and economic and political interests other than his own (p. 
111-112).  
 To create a type of man immune and invincible to the modern individual‟s absence 
of a cause (a why to live rather than a how), one who is able to realize “genius,” Bildung 
provides Nietzsche with a rhetorical medium for his attempt at formation. This is for the 
sake of a lasting work, like the artist wishing to sculpt a nature to outshine and outlast his 
own.  The point is that Nietzsche‟s lectures on education are a working-towards a genius, 
an Ubermensch. The medium for this higher man is found in the qualities stemming from 
aesthetic creation. His project is in this sense more an elevation of the artistic work 
produced by an elite circle than it is of the human worker. The subject, humankind, is not 
simultaneously both the means and the goal of an education but something seemingly to 
be metamorphised into an aesthetic artifact. Nietzsche says those who work within such 
institutions are prolegomena for the coming of the genius, and the genius for sake of the 
magnum opus: 
 These individuals should complete their work, that is the meaning of their 
communal institution—and indeed a work, that, as it were, should be 
purified from the imprint of the subject and carried out above the interplay 
of the times, as the clear mirroring of the eternal and unchanging essence 
of the same. And all who have a part in that institution should take trouble 
through such a purification of subjectivity to prepare the birth of the 
genius and the begetting of his work (2004, p. 97). 
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Nietzsche on the pertinence of nature’s influence 
 The prerequisite out of which such a work is to grow is a highly attuned perception 
of nature. Such elements should speak a language of their own: the “forest, rock, vulture, 
flower, butterfly, meadow, mountain slope...speak in their own tongues” (Nietzsche, 
2004, p. 83). Such connections to the undeveloped wilderness help a creative inner life 
blossom. Nietzsche writes, “in [nature] must he at some time recognize himself again as 
in countless dispersed reflections and mirages” (p. 83). This disposition is central to the 
study of nature according to empirical measurements, which diminish artistic and 
philosophic intuitions. As Nietzsche puts this, 
Here that naive metaphysics is at an end: and physiology of plants and 
animals, geology, inorganic chemistry compel their followers toward a 
completely altered consideration of nature. What has been lost through 
this new compulsory consideration is...the instinctive, true, and singular 
understanding of nature, in whose place a clever calculation and 
outwitting of nature now has tread (p. 84). 
 
Continuity between these traditionally separate categories arises when the poetic observer 
can relate his interior self within the outer-appearances, the “reflections and mirages” 
(2004, p. 83) of natural phenomena. Self-realization arises simultaneously from the extent 
to which the world of nature discloses itself to the self. Yet Nietzsche‟s conception of 
nature already goes beyond self-realization. It is a means to teaching higher wisdom and 
includes the importance of being able to “calm himself in [nature‟s] eternal persistence 
and necessity” (p. 83). 
 Nietzsche‟s Bildung seeks to cultivate this Greek disposition in relation to nature. 
Perhaps because he rightly understood how deeply embedded nature was to the poets and 
philosophers of antiquity, the presence of nature is an inextricable part of Bildung for 
him. The presence of this meaning, poetically intuited, ensures an essential continuity in 
the study of Greek classics. Otherwise, Nietzsche fears scientific measurement as the 
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uncontested, unquestionable parameters of nature, or as a scientific explorer‟s journey 
into the unknown (a view of science consonant with wonder that Nietzsche does not seem 
to embrace). Nietzsche criticizes the “clever calculation and outwitting of nature” 
resulting in scientists‟ alienation from “the contemplative instincts of their childhood” 
(Nietzsche, 2004, p.84). Systemization does not disclose actual knowledge of nature even 
while it allows for the “outwitting of nature” (p. 84). “Self knowledge” could not be 
trusted; here, rather, what is sought is the inspiration of nature as a source of self-
creation.   
 Nietzsche’s nature is not, as one might expect, a fanciful, sentimental attachment to 
“poetic phantasmagoria” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 84). Rather, it is a wish for the human 
produced by Bildung to be characterized by effervescence, effectively replacing the 
natural environment’s bringing forth with the theoretical progeny of philosophic 
composition. The narrative of Nietzsche’s lectures themselves seeks to demonstrate at 
least a minor degree of artistic improvisation. The text is imbued with extended 
descriptions of natural imagery. Near the beginning, for example, the narrator mentions 
how the “evening clouds above us reddened all the more and the evening became even 
quieter and milder, while we almost overheard the regular breathing of nature, as it 
concluded its day’s work, satisfied with its work of art, the perfect day” (p. 30). Such 
imagery forms the metaphoric architecture of Nietzsche‟s visionary educational 
“institution.”  
Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Battles against Quantitative Methods 
 Nietzsche’s adversity to quantitative measures comes across most forthrightly in 
the preface opening the lectures. He provides a taste of hallmark sarcasm, apologizing for  
being “unable to satisfy the friends of tables” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 18).  Nietzsche does  
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not single out a particular work of pedagogy for criticism, and what literature he actually 
has in mind is not known from the lectures. So strong is his resistance to the very form 
taken by educational research that his lectures embrace just the opposite: tableaux 
replaces table, poetic allusion replaces scientific research. In addition, the dialogue seems 
written to appeal to the dramatist and composer. 
 Even beginning such a journey is comparable to “climbing a passable mountain” 
(Nietzsche, 2004, p. 18). As Nietzsche himself puts it, he will have “permitted myself to 
delight in the free view” (p. 18) of the culture he finds indispensable to educational 
growth. Those who only pretend to have seen should take heed. Here is Nietzsche 
again— “the feeling for the classical-Hellenic is so rare a result of the most strenuous 
educational struggle and of artistic talent that the Gymnasium can already raise the claim 
to wake this feeling only through a coarse misunderstanding” (p. 55). 
Nietzsche’s Emphasis on Wonder 
 Nietzsche‟s lectures culminate with an effect. This is the influence of Bildung, a 
profound sense of philosophic wonder about the world at large (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 108). 
For his Philosopher, a genuine education will be measured by “three barometers: once by 
his need for philosophy, then by his instinct for art, and finally by Greek and Roman 
antiquity as the embodied categorical imperative of all culture” (p. 108).  Nietzsche waits 
to reveal this purpose in lecture V. “The human being,” he writes, “is so surrounded by 
the most serious and most difficult problems that, led to them in the right way, in time he 
comes to that lasting, philosophic wonder, upon which alone, as upon a fruitful subsoil, 
can grow a deep and noble culture” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 108). Such astonishment in 
Nietzsche‟s view is necessary to a philosopher. As with Plato, he finds wonder as a state 
of mind necessary for philosophy.  
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 Nietzsche, however, contrasts with Plato where he reveals his anti-modernism. For 
Nietzsche, there are less pleasant feelings to procede wonder. Given the prevalence of the 
“glutted and colorfully adorned caravan of education of the present,” a person of culture 
should be “horrified” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 81). Whereas the Socratic dialogue seeks the 
students’ epiphany of knowing they do not know, in Nietzsche’s view the weaknesses in 
both education and modern sciences is comparable to the condition of Oedipus—that 
there is too little that remains unknown. 
  Wonder, to a philosopher like Nietzsche, does not lend itself to acquisitive 
tendency, nor to any simplification. Wonder is the antithesis of the reductionism involved 
in learning about a text, as opposed to actually ruminating with a text. Deeply personal to 
the human being‟s struggle through experience, one‟s “own experiences lead him to these 
problems, and especially in the stormy period of youth, almost every personal event 
mirrors in a doubled glimmer, as an exemplification of an everyday matter and at the 
same time as an eternal, astonishing problem, worthy of explanation” (Nietzsche, 2004, 
108).  Nietzsche‟s novel reading of Greek tragedy and philosophy seeks to lay the 
groundwork for this disposition. By means of the sentiments of these texts and the 
elevation of wonder, he seems to express hope in the philosopher who can use the very 
obscurity of antiquity as an authority over and rival to the dominant scientific paradigms 
of thought in his time.  
Democracy as Developmental Antithesis for Nietzsche 
 Nietzsche’s conception of Bildung is at odds with democratic sentiments. As he 
says, “One democratizes the rights of genius in order to be relieved from the personal 
task of education” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 35). The form of democratization Nietzsche most 
frequently fulminates about in these lectures is the proliferation of information via 
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journalism.  
 The natural consequence of these sentiments is a habituation to laziness. As 
Nietzsche says, “in an empty and disconsolate mood he sees his plans go up in smoke: his 
condition is abominable and undignified: he alternates between overexcited activity and 
melancholic enervation” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 111). Meanwhile, individuals become less 
able to comprehend the linguistic rigor of the past, and therefore, less able to recreate it 
for the sake of the future. Again, in Nietzsche’s words: “In sum: the Gymnasium 
neglects…the mother tongue: therewith, however, it lacks the naturally fruitful soil for all 
further educational exertions” (p. 52). Cultural flourishing for Nietzsche rests on the 
authority of the culture-makers, those whose imaginations are fertile enough to give birth 
to a whole way of life. Nietzsche wanted his own philosophy to serve as analogous to a 
physician curing an unhealthy patient.   
 A philosopher, to be healthy, must shun the power of public opinion. Nietzsche 
demands cultural resources, a shared discourse within which a philosopher‟s words are 
heard. The undertaking of Bildung is for the sake of a genuine philosophy that can only 
be realized many years later. Not having a culture with which to engage, the Old 
Philosopher‟s sentiments are somewhat embittered. He now has only his former student 
with whom to confer. Yet the expected long-time friend he speaks of never appears. Thus 
Nietzsche posits a philosopher whose thoughts are free, but unheard, except through the 
written word. 
Critique of Nietzsche’s Conception of Bildung 
 Nietzsche uses the idea of Bildung to produce a higher genius (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 
42). His character is more literary than actual. He idealizes a higher human type, one with 
a charismatic personality able to transform institutions of culture in his image. Nietzsche 
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memorably illustrates this through the simile of a conductor over an orchestra: 
With winged imagination, set for once a genius, a real genius in the midst 
of this mass--immediately you notice something unbelievable. It is as if 
this genius, in a lightning transmigration of souls, had traveled into all 
these half-animal bodies and as if now from all of them in turn only one 
demonic eye peered out. But now listen and look--you will never be able 
to hear enough! When you now consider again the orchestra, loftily 
storming, or tenderly lamenting, when you sense nimble eagerness in 
every muscle and rhythmic necessity in every gesture, then you will feel 
sympathetically what a pre-established harmony between leader and 
followers is, and how in the order of spirits everything presses toward the 
construction of an organization of that sort (2004, p. 119).  
 
With this analogy, Nietzsche effectively elevates a higher archetypal being over a shared 
humanity. He seeks this higher man (likely in himself) to justify his harmonious 
conception of Bildung. Because of this dependence on a prophetic philosopher that no 
actual person seems able to embody, Nietzsche must wait in vain in these lectures for him 
to actually appear. Yet the last lecture is never written. The Old Philosopher is right after 
all: “ „You know whom we are awaiting here: but he is no longer coming. We were here 
so long for nothing: we should go‟ ” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 86).  Meanwhile, Nietzsche 
foregoes a consideration of realizing Bildung within human beings and their institutions 
as they are, with all of their uneven qualities. 
 The lectures comprising On the Future could also be taken more as literature than a 
plan that can be left to the vicissitudes of experience. If therefore, Nietzsche‟s 
educational thoughts are not to be applied outside a literary-philosophical work, the text 
could simply be understood as an improvisational sketch that he would go on develop in 
his more mature period. Those seeking an understanding of Bildung as a substantive and 
intellectually rigorous program for education, however, may be disappointed. Nietzsche‟s 
Bildung seems forever encased in a quasi-literary narrative, confined to a world that can 
only exist in text. The question remains in On the Future of just how Bildung can manage 
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to be more than an aesthetic theory of education. 
 A further difficulty is that even on the literary level, Nietzsche‟s characters seem 
opaque, like rudimentary sketches,  with the two students too similar for dramatic 
differences to emerge. There is the absence of character names. They remain static, 
yearning for development. The dialogic aspect is less a carefully crafted dramatic 
confrontation of educational ideas as multiple outlets for similar declamations against 
bourgoise literature, media, and scholarship. Meanwhile, the lectures deify the Greece of 
the 5th century. Moreover, there is the possibility in On the Future that readers fall prey 
to the notion that the higher elite Nietzsche constantly extols becomes the only class of 
existence to which they would wish to belong. Nietzsche feeds on any latent sense of 
grandiosity in these lectures, perhaps as a way of impressing his lecture audience. 
  Delusional notions of genius aside, Nietzsche‟s exhortation could indeed be 
inspiring to anyone who seeks in education the meaning and personal fulfillment to 
which Prange refers (2004, p. 508). Yet Nietzsche all too easily dismisses those for 
whom education is part of the struggle for the “necessities of life” (Nietzsche, 2004, p. 
85).  
 Challenging this notion, for example, is Frederick Douglas‟ Narrative, whose story 
of maturity, or bildungsroman, is an eloquent portrait of moral courage and the human 
spirit, just as it also a struggle to survive and escape slavery. Nietzsche‟s lectures do not 
address Bildung in the face of such desperate hardship. He continually promotes an 
education in which need and survival are seen as inferior, always writing off the “struggle 
for existence” as unworthy of a great culture or character. Against this view, a philosophy 
of human formation could actively support human beings in the most oppressive physical 
circumstances, providing possible routes and concepts of participation for them to one 
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day become living cultural resources, authorities on matters like ethics, science, 
aesthetics, politics, and education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
KLAUSE PRANGE’S RECONSIDERATION OF BILDUNG 
 
Four Critera within Prange’s account  
 Nietzsche‟s view of Bildung, therefore, is at odds with a democratic conception of 
the self and state in which educational flourishing is to take place. However, Bildung 
itself need hardly rest on the authority of Nietzsche‟s narrative. Preoccupation with 
Bildung can also mean seeking an amenable learning environment, or to refer to an 
earlier passage in this essay, the “underlying structure” that characterizes the experience 
of education within the walls of a school, in the disposition of teachers toward their jobs, 
students toward their classes, the nature of what is studied, the way it is evaluated, and 
the purposes to which success is directed. Nietzsche had his own answers to what 
characterized the best educational objectives and participants, to be sure. Yet difficulties 
with aspects of Nietzsche‟s lectures, as discussed above, should encourage further 
openness to what constitutes “best” in terms of a culture for student learning and 
teaching.  
  Bildung considered anew can be defined as fostering a conception of education that 
assumes an uncommon degree of confidence in human beings, while placing a premium 
on the value of learning and the content learned. This is a matter of creating a culture 
where all participants in the educational process—especially the teachers, the students, 
and those who plan curricula--would both provide confidence and support in the goal of 
development. Such confidence in both present and future human worth seeks to develop 
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these qualities as ideal “representatives” of a collective community; “community” in this 
context is primarily the school. Such a notion of Bildung is only achieved by the active 
participation and passionate persuasion of all involved. This consideration of Bildung, 
unlike Nietzsche‟s, is far from opposed to democratic education. Rather than being a 
reaction against the democratic self, this education seeks its realization for a community 
of citizens.  
 A democratic conception of Bildung posits five  criteria for sustaining a positive 
educational climate, suitable to high expectations and for the acquisition of human 
cultural content. These five criteria seek to express what is meant by a “positive 
educational climate.” Each will be discussed separately, though their overlapping 
relations are important.  
  Four criteria described below are arguably transformative at both the individual 
and community level. Bildung at the individual level recognizes the intrinsic worth of the 
student and assumes diverse and as yet undiscovered possibilities for his or her future. 
Bildung for the school community essentially results in what the Greeks referred to as an 
Agora--an energetic marketplace for the free exchange of ideas. This ideal of learning is  
motivated by curiosity about the curricular content and from the integration of the 
varying abilities and casts of mind in teachers and students that respond to this 
curriculum. Such an Agora is a supportive, “pro-learning environment,” one with positive 
emotions on the part of teachers, students and parents. Below, the four criteria are turned 
to in more detail.  
First Criterion: Intrinsic worth and potential  
 The human being is the ultimate topic of education. What such a person is “worth” 
lies outside of economic or social functions. The latter is not sufficient, as Prange notes, 
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“in view of the inalienable claim to personal perfection. This is where Bildung comes in” 
(Prange, 2004, p. 501). Bildung assumes the worth of human beings by engaging the 
aesthetic and spiritual sides of experience. Bildung in this way promotes a positive, noble 
view of human beings (which does not necessarily fall into the trap of self-flattery) “by 
its very existence as a living memory of our potential to give a meaning to what we do 
and experience” (p. 508). 
 Prevailing educational methodologies do not accept this complete view of 
humanity. Quantitative and psychological observation, for example, would present a 
vastly more limited view of the human subject (Prange, 2004, p. 501). The same can be 
said for equating teaching with testing, insofar as it would eliminate “the unpredictable 
variability of human responses to the moral, mental, and aesthetic qualities of education” 
(p. 504). Prange sees such methodologies as representing a counter, mechanistic view of 
men and women, citing a disarming proximity to achieving La Mettrie‟s 1748 tretise, 
L’homme machine. The French thinker‟s idea that humans are automatons, Prange says, 
“is not a dream, but nor is it a nightmare” (p. 504), or something impervious to near-
universal acceptance. Prange views the technological edifices of modern education as 
encouraging the surrender of human reason. While such edifices cannot be eradicated, a 
total reliance on them ignores the natural human abilities that should be respected and 
practiced.  Finally, prolonged ignorance of the unexplored possibilities of both reason and 
imagination could have the consequence of “a new kind of obedience,” (p. 504) where 
inevitably persons are dispirited by the “imperatives of organized reason” and the “rules 
of the game” (p. 505).  
Second Criterion: Aesthetics and worth of learning 
 Just as Bildung helps provide a view of humans as wondrous, as the focus of 
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teaching, so also does it take great care in the content that serves to nourish students in 
their thinking, reasoning, imagining, constructing and acting. Such is the purpose of a 
curriculum informed by Bildung—conscious nourishment. The content of such a 
curriculum reveals basic as well as subtle truths about how people understand themselves 
and what constitutes a tactful relation to others. Classics from both the ancient and 
modern worlds offer students opportunities to consider meaningful questions about their 
own place in the world, and what relationships might be seen in the course of events, 
actions, and the chance encounters of their own experience. Classic literature is especially 
apt to present these relationships in their most aesthetically pleasing and suggestively 
significant light.  
 In a Bildung for today, students study a body of literature belonging to one or more 
cultural traditions. Prange, for his part refers to the western cannon: the “cultural heritage 
from Homer down to James Joyce” (Prange, 2004, p. 505). Although a curriculum of 
European sources suits Bildung (which is, after all a Western idea), the more important 
principle for a contemporary adaptation of the term is to highlight the intrinsic worth of 
learning itself by making sure that the content has value in terms of how today‟s world 
may be organized and why. Thus, a Chinese classic like the Analects of Confucius, or a 
recent breakthrough in astronomy or possibility for transportation would both be 
examples of this quality. Such content is thus examined in terms of the resonance and 
challenge it provides in our learning experiences (p. 508).  
 Any of such curricula holds interest both for the profound way it entertains student 
curiosity and for the excitement of exploring the unknown. Even though the study of a 
high quality curriculum would never fail to challenge students, the sense of importance 
and interest in relation to individual and societal questions aims at producing more 
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satisfaction in perceiving the diversity of human experience. Such satisfaction taken from 
the learning process is a matter of responsibility corroborating with inclination.  
 What is described above may seem too broad for what is possible within the 
constraints of a school, where daily lessons must be implemented and classrooms must be 
organized around specific accomplishments. Yet this approach to curriculum need not 
exclude the infrastructure of school settings. As Prange notes, “Method and systematic 
instruction are by no means superfluous, they serve as a stepping stone, or to put it 
formally: method is a necessary condition of, not a sufficient reason for, Bildung” 
(Prange, 2004, p. 508). The practical business of teaching the steps to obtaining 
satisfaction in this curricular material would still be quite necessary. Bildung again would 
serve as an appreciation for these works as a whole, just as it would create an 
environment hospitable to learning. Bildung can be considered “a sort of educational 
surplus beyond measurement” (p. 508), serving to imbue whatever is studied as deeply 
beneficial, together rewarding both teacher and student participation.   
Third Criterion: Learning as a humane endeavor 
 Both the value of human beings and the value placed on what is learned combine in 
a view of human beings as learners. This view informs a school modeled on principles of 
Bildung. Rather than make distinctions between “proficient” and “remedial” students, or 
“highly competent” and “weak” teachers, Bildung arguably views all human beings on a 
continuum of lifelong learning. Learning and personal growth are not somehow thought 
of as apart. 
  This attitude of human beings as ever unfinished, or always a story en medias res 
would seem strange to a system of rigid evaluation. As Prange says, it would “be 
somewhat irregular, if not ridiculous, to give marks for the state of Bildung. We cannot 
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measure the personal equation that characterizes our interpretation of what we learn” 
(Prange, 2004, p. 507-508).  
 Consider how this person-as-learner dynamic impacts students and teachers. Each 
student focuses on communicating what is learned, on refinement in thinking, and 
awareness of new interests. Teachers can then serve as model learners, demonstrating an 
inquisitiveness and tenacity about their subjects. They do not assume that they know 
everything there is to know about their students and how to instruct them. As fellow-
learners, teachers would show sensitivity and curiosity about the quality of character and 
diversity of abilities in their students. They appreciate and work with the complexities 
and irregularities in those they teach. Effective teachers arguably demonstrate genuine 
and unassuming interest in their students, and have more success with procuring trust.  
Fourth Criterion: Bildung and preparation for participation in civil institutions 
 This microcosm of Bildung, this community of learners, wherein learner and 
learning are passionately valued, can be applied to the larger political and economic 
spheres of work.  Its impact is to make civil institutions far more humane and intelligent. 
At present, work environments are dominated by what Prange refers to as “adherence to 
the codes of our jobs, our professions” (2004, p. 505). These codes are equally if not 
more stringent than the rigid forms of assessment taking place for teachers and students. 
As Prange puts it idiosyncratically, such codes, for employee and student alike, is “right 
or wrong my job, my profession, my firm”  (p. 505).  
 The absolutism of a company or school ideology can take a severe toll on any sense 
of individual worth or obstruct the possibility of friendship between colleagues within an 
institution. Yet social cohesion and mutual interests are some of the very qualities that 
Bildung would seek to cultivate. Public virtue relies on encouragement of greater 
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cooperation, maturity and ability in a given body of citizens, whose education should 
expand their own faculties, and seriously value the talents of their peers. Such maturity is 
realized via participation in government infrastructure and other civil institutions. This 
democratic sense of worth and possibility is lost sight of, eventually occluded by narrow, 
technical aims set in some schools and continued in the work place. As Prange notes, 
“standards and professional codes of ethics are neither strictly based on the morality of 
the individual nor on the legality of the general public order; they are placed in between, 
exercising the authority of what is technically appropriate” (2004, p. 505). 
 Therefore, education as a form of culture should prepare more human beings to 
exercise wide-ranging responsibilities, thus making places of work, from economics to 
the arts, more intelligent, creative, and ethical. Exclusive reliance on testing-measures for 
educational performance encourages a feeling of being inadequate to the expectations of 
a classroom, and soon enough this sense of inadequacy carries over to the professional 
setting. It therefore continues to exclude a variety of human talents that may not be so 
easily measured, such as synthesis of seemingly paradoxical ideas, or a comfort with 
complexity. A more democratic account of Bildung places greater confidence in the 
variety of human strengths, and on the value of pursuing one‟s career as an inquisitive 
learner rather than through a default demand from the powers-that-be for a ready-made 
final authority of assessment.   
 Bildung, with its emphasis on quality cultural sources and confidence in human 
potential, provides necessary tools in thinking and imagination to defend against 
altogether dull conglomerations of information. Examples of this in the present include 
financial, technological, and media institutions that see education as an opportunity for 
conditioning young minds to become obedient consumers. Prange points out an 
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underlying structure and organizational approach to education similar to Bildung from the 
ancient world--Paideia. This word, like Bildung, has the same duel definition of both 
child rearing and the culture or civilization of a people.  
 At least in Prange’s view of the term, Paideia provided communities that were 
relatively isolated from power (perhaps in the conquered cities of Greece?) with wisdom, 
validation and quiet purpose within their schools, working “as a counter-authority to 
Roman power and superiority. It was weak in terms of political or economic strength, and 
yet strong as a mediating force” (2004, p. 508). Prange goes on to describe Paideia as 
“the expression of intellectual and moral autonomy” situated under the “restrictions,” of 
Roman might and pragmatic politics. Students of Bildung today can similarly gain 
confidence in their ability to “mediate” with government and private authority. Not 
necessarily possessing the influence of wealth and political connections to which such 
authority is usually privy, students of Bildung are able to turn to their substantive 
educations for confidence in their ability to persuade public officials away from 
narrowminded or abusive policies, and in favor of what contributes to a community.  
Although such a state is surely more of a theoretical ideal than an actuality, Bildung is 
again that mediating force for education between this either/or dichotomy of idea versus 
practice. Or as Prange puts it, Bildung thrives at the meeting point of “what belongs to the 
seeming reality of the world and the true reality of ideas, eternal values and practical 
issues here and now” (2004, p. 506).  
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Education is often an inherently frustrating effort. The variables involved seem 
innumerable, and perversely subject to change. What curricula, what level of challenge is 
appropriate, how to assess, who the teachers and students ought to be, what pedagogies to 
consider, what means of motivation are effective and why, what environment should 
situate a given school, what rationales are offered for learning, how money should be 
allocated, what role technology should play, whether students learn by discovery, guided 
instruction, or direct instruction--all such questions have persisted so long as there have 
been schools. That ancient philosophers well before Plato disputed what learning was, 
and how it took place, can be heard in a fragment passed down from Heraclitus, sounding 
somewhat like a quip: Much learning does not teach thought.  
 The confusion experienced by students and teachers defines the work of education 
as they alternately succeed or fail at teaching and learning. Scholars of education, then, 
are presented with a field arguably more fraught with challenge than any other, where all 
that is researched is radically dependent on the whims of individual and collective 
consciousness. This in turn impacts young minds passively observing or participating in 
their classrooms, and in the attempted strategies of teachers based on their moment to 
moment attempts to communicate knowledge and information that for various reasons 
and agendas are deemed relevant.  
 Not surprisingly, the attempt to formulate a unified science out of educational 
processes has yet to come to any satisfactory ends. Instead, there are innumerable, 
fragmented methodologies involved in the study of education. Research purporting to 
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demonstrate the effectiveness of say, core standards curricula, is attacked by equal 
quantities of opposing evidence. They argue instead, for example, for a heavy reliance on 
information technology and students‟ purported “media savvy.”  
 Educational policy makers (in our society often those with substantial political and 
financial power) dismiss jostling, competing educational perspectives, convinced instead 
of the infallibility of their own agendas for school reform. The latest such program to be 
implemented on a national level, of course, is the infamous No Child Left Behind Act. In 
total, it is a blank, default collection of demands for schools with no intelligible (or 
intelligent) idea of how growth can occur for individuals within educational contexts, let 
alone arrive at some higher goal. In NCLB, goals do not exist--there are no higher ends 
beyond a quantitative score deeming a student, a teacher, an administrator, a district as 
“proficient.” Neither does NCLB offer a well-thought out process, or means, even for the 
narrow demands of quantitative performance. This is left to the devices of students, 
teachers, parents and other support structures. Consequentially, students with the least 
degree of infastructure are those most vulnerable to fall short of NCLB‟s demands. As 
even the shallower means (testable strategies of retention and “means” in the monetary 
sense) to these measurable demands are lacking, there is the more critical deficiency of 
how an embodied process of humanization might be experienced, appreciated, and at 
least partly if never fully demystified.  
 Bildung, can be considered as a way to fulfill this vital principle. It is both a means 
and an ends for education. The means is the value assigned to the process of growth in 
the learner. The goals, or ends of Bildung result in individual and collective meaning 
found in one‟s self, one‟s relationship to others, and to the larger world. The content of 
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this end, of the meaning, takes on an aesthetic value, in contrast to a “measurable 
outcome” that seeks to be fully self-explanatory. Whereas a high test score, or a high 
income, are portrayed as property successfully attained, the satisfaction taken from both a 
moral direction and a disposition to wonder cannot be owned or used like a commodity. 
This satisfaction that Bildung hopes to bring about becomes aesthetic rather than 
completely intelligible in the same way that the power of art does not necessarily stem 
from its intelligibility but rather from its more emotional connection. Such means and 
ends for Bildung seek to go beyond a human‟s immediate, though very real, need for 
survival.  
 Consider briefly another precedent set by Bildung during the highly tumultuous, 
revolutionary period in Europe from the 1780‟s to 1840‟s: The “Romantic circle” during 
these years assumed that political upheaval could allow for greater participation by 
greater numbers of people in the institutions of civil society, and that this would also 
mean greater economic opportunity as a result of such participation (Beiser, 1998, p. 
284). Intellectuals and poets at the close of the 18th century initially supported the hopes  
for a more democratic citizenry before the onset of the French Revolution (1998, p. 284).  
As ideals of universal fraternity gave way to the terror of indiscriminate executions, men 
and women of letters appealed to education through culture, to Bildung, as the best hope 
for the recently liberated (p. 285). 
 In the present, Bildung can seek to foster more far-sighted development, including 
economic. Such growth does not have to be defined by statistical quantities each moment, 
always fluctuating. Economic growth would be a beneficial by-product of an education 
that prepares more of the public for participation in government infrastructure and other 
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civil bodies, wisely guided by leaders entrusted to seek a common good. In this view, 
economic and political growth is understood as in tandem with the development of 
humanity.  
 Such a concept of Bildung is greatly needed, when development on all fronts—
economic, political, social, intellectual, imaginative—seems inert, thwarted, powerless. A 
series of factors, from federal and state educational policies to the preparation of teachers 
to the priorities of students, does little to convince or inform the public of the possibility 
of an educational vision that would inspire a serious commitment to learning and allow 
humans to flourish in more than one particular, narrow sense. Bildung, in truly cultivating 
the whole human being, eschews the reductionism of human faculties so prevalent in this 
time. Bildung can serve to broaden the notion of “profit” associated with monetary gain  
as something far greater when considering questions of how one can best spend time (in 
the sense of kairos). 
  Bildung, then, serves as a synthesis for the fragmentation of disparate educational 
concerns, such as the debate between a “general” well-rounded curriculum or the 
preparation for a specific task in the knowledge economy, or whether learning should 
respond to students‟ individual levels of ability and interest, or encourage social 
cohesion.  It seeks to connect the curricula being learned to the cultural sources and 
foundations embedded therein. The nature of what is studied is not isolated from the 
human being who desires to learn, nor from the individual philosophies of education to 
which learners best respond. It seeks to elevate an appreciation of education as the very 
human quest to better express who and what people are. Unlike in Nietzsche‟s 
conception, this concern is a shared inquiry and activity by all members of the human 
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family. Bildung permeates effective schools, those in which quality learning transpires, 
when they encompass the range of human interests, teaching methods, learner 
preferences, curiosity, motivation, and environment. This combinations forms a living 
aesthetic, wherein schools become macrocosms of individuals.  
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